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THE  NAVAL  POLICY  OF  AMERICA  AS  OUTLINED  IN  MESSAGES  OF  THE 
PRESIDENTS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  FROM  THE  BEGINNING  TO  THE 
PRESENT  DAY. 


The  following  references  ^  by  Presidents  of  the  United  States  to 
the  urgent  need  of  the  United  States  possessing  a  proper  Navy,  cor- 
responding to  the  Nation's  position  as  a  great  power,  and  ready  at 
any  time  for  efficient  service  in  war,  could  be  multiplied  a  thousand- 
fold from  the  speeches  and  writings  of  almost  all  the  statesmen  who 
have  striven  disinterestedly  and  intelligently  for  the  true  honor  and 
greatness  of  America.  By  no  means  all  of  the  references  made  by 
the  Presidents  themselves  have  been  taken.  Many  of  them,  such 
as  President  Taylor's  urgent  appeals  for  the  establishment  of  a 
retiring  list  and  pension  list,  and  the  improvement  of  the  personnel 
of  the  Navy,  or  the  recitals  of  the  glory  gained  and  conferred  by  the 
Navy  in  the  War  of  1812  and  the  Civil  War,  are  omitted  because 
they  do  not  bear  on  the  problem  of  the  present  day,  which  is,  in  my 
own  opinion,  to  further  strengthen  the  Navy,  both  in  materiel  and 
personnel,  in  battleships,  in  torpedo  boats,  in  dry  docks,  in  numbers 
of  officers  and  men. 

Fortunately  the  quality  of  the  ships  and  guns  and  of  the  officers 
and  men  that  we  have  is  excellent. 

The  utterances  of  the  Presidents  here  quoted  tell  in  outline  the 
groAvth  of  the  Navy.  Washington  first  advocated  its  formation  for 
reasons  which  apply  now  as  forcibly  as  they  applied  when  he  wrote, 
over  a  century  ago.  What  he  said  shows  well  how,  on  this  as  on  all 
other  questions,  the  greatest  of  Americans  approached  every  problem 
of  vital  interest  to  America  in  a  spirit  of  the  broadest  patriotism  and 
statesmanship,  combined  with  clear  appreciation  of  the  needs  of  the 
present  and  keen  insight  into  the  greater  needs  which  the  future 
would  develop. 

Under  the  elder  Adams  the  Navy  which  Washington  advocated 
was  actually  begun,  and  even  in  its  infancy  it  accomplished  feats 
of  note.  The  work  of  building  it  up  was  unwisely  stopped,  and 
the  War  of  1812  showed  clearly  the  vital  benefits  conferred  upon  the 

*  Where  necessary  they  are  slightly  condensed. 


482GG9 


2  ;.\ ;  ;••  •  ^•jjp^^^ict^ij^  ?JV\'4ii*  policy. 

Nation  by  the  little  Navy  which  it  possessed,  and  the  terrible  loss 
and  damage  caused  by  the  fact  that  in  size  this  Navy  was  but  a  small 
fraction  of  what  it  should  have  been.  The  utterances  of  Monroe, 
the  younger  Adams,  and  Andrew  Jackson  show  that  the  lesson  was 
at  least  partially  learned,  and  our  Navy,  though  never  brought  up 
quite  to  the  standard  it  should  have  been  in  point  of  size,  was  never- 
theless maintained  in  a  condition  not  wholly  out  of  proportion  to  the 
needs  and  the  honor  of  the  Nation. 

Especial  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  third  quotation  from 
Andrew  Jackson.  The  victor  of  New '  Orleans  had  that  "  instinct 
for  the  jugular  "  which  is  possessed  by  every  great  fighter.  All  that 
he  says  applies  to  the  present  day,  fpr,  as  he  points  out  so  clearly, 
the  only  effective  defensive  is  the  offensive ;  the  only  way  to  defend 
our  own  seacoast  properly  is  to  attack  our  enemy  instead  of  wait- 
ing for  him  to  attack  us.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  can  not  afford 
to  rely  purely  upon  torpedo  boats  or  upon  any  kind  of  mere  coast - 
defense  vessels.  Though  it  is,  of  course,  absolutely  necessary  to 
have  an  abundance  of  torpedo  boats,  we  must  also  possess  a  powerful 
fleet  of  ships  able  to  hold  the  seas,  able  to  make  long  voyages,  to  stand 
rough  weather,  and  to  meet  and  overcome  in  the  shock  of  actual  fight 
any  enem3^'s  fleet ;  for  it  is  the  enemy's  fleet  which  should  be  the  true 
objective  in  naval  war.  Fortifications  are  indispensable,  but  they  in 
no  sense  equ^d,  or  supply  the  place  of,  a  fighting  Navy. 

The  effect  of  bringing  the  Navy  up  to  something  like  a  proper 
standard  was  shown  in  the  inestimable  services  it  rendered  during 
the  Civil  War.  It  is  characteristic  of  Lincoln's  farseeing  statesman- 
ship and  loving  care  for  the  welfare,  ultimate  as  well  as  immediate,  of 
the  people  for  whom  he  was  soon  to  lay  down  his  life,  that  in  the 
midst  of  the  iron  stress  of  the  Civil  War,  when  the  problems  of  the 
present  would  have  wholly  absorbed  any  lesser  man,  he  should  yet 
have  thouirht  of  the  future  in  connection  with  our  Navv,  and  should 
have  advocated  the  building  of  those  seagoing  battleships  which, 
though  not  needed  in  civil  strife,  would  most  assuredly  be  indispen- 
sable if  the  honor  and  renown  of  America  were  to  be  upheld  against 
foreign  powers. 

After  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  there  came  a  period  of  reaction 
and  decline.  In  spite  of  President  Grant's  repeated  warning  and 
protests,  a  spirit  of  economy  prevailed,  and  our  Navy  was  suffered  to 
sink  below  the  level  of  that  of  even  the  third-rate  powers.  Then,  in 
the  middle  of  President  Arthur's  administration,  the  turn  came ;  the 
people  and  their  representatives  awoke  to  what  was  demanded  by 
national  self-respect,  the  foundations  of  our  present  Navy  were 
laid,  and  ever  since  then  under  every  administration  the  work  of 
building  it  up  has  gone  steadily  on. 


In  point  of  efficiency  our  ships  need  fear  comparison  with  those  of 
no  foreign  nation,  and  though  they  are  not  as  numerous  as  they 
should  ultimately  be,  yet  long  strides  in  the  right  direction  have  been 
taken.  If  we  continue  to  build  up  our  Navy  for  a  few  years  to  come 
along  the  lines  we  have  followed  for  the  15  years  immediately  past, 
we  shall,  within  a  comparatively  short  period,  place  the  United 
States  where  she  should  be,  among  the  naval  powers  of  the  world 
Such  a  Nav}^  would  be,  as  all  of  our  great  leaders  from  the  days  of 
Washington  and  the  elder  Adams  to  our  own  have  pointed  out,  the 
surest  guarantee  of  peace ;  and  if  by  any  unlucky  chance  we  were  to 
have  war  it  would  not  merely  save  us  from  material  disasters,  but 
what  is  of  incalculably  more  moment,  it  would  prevent  that  loss  of 
national  honor  which  would  be  felt  as  keenly  in  the  farthest  interior 
of  the  countrv  as  on  the  seaboard  of  the  Atlantic  or  the  Pacific. 

THEODORE  ROOSEVELT, 

Assistant  Secretary. 

(I'.ronght  up-to-date,  1922.) 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

Jamiary,  8.  1790. 

To  be  prepared  for  war  is  one  of  the  most  effectual  means  of 
preserving  peace. 


Annual  Address. 

Decemher  7,  1796. 


To  secure  respect  to  a  neutral  flag  requires  a  naval  force  organized 
and  ready  to  vindicate  it  from  insult  or  aggression.  This  may  even 
prevent  the  necessity  of  going  to  war  by  discouraging  belligerent 
powers  from  committing  such  violations  of  the  rights  of  the  neutral 
party  as  may,  first  or  last,  leave  no  other  option. 

These  considerations  invite  the  United  States  to  look  to  the  means 
and  to  set  about  the  gradual  creation  of  a  Navy. 

However  pacific  the  general  policy  of  a  nation  may  be,  it  ought 
never  to  be  without  an  adequate  stock  of  military  knowledge  for 
emergencies.  This  lack  would  impair  the  energy  of  its  character 
and  hazard  its  safety  or  expose  it  to  greater  evils  when  war  could 
not  be  avoided;  besides  that,  war  might  often  not  depend  upon  its 
own  choice.  In  proportion  as  the  observance  of  pacific  maxims 
might  exempt  a  nation  from  the  necessity  of  practicing  the  rules  of 
the  military  art  ought  to  be  its  care  in  preserving  and  transmitting, 
by    proper  establishments,   the   knowledge   of  that 'art.     The   art 


4  /•*•. ;  ;•**:  ^•>ri:er(l^x^  tx.\V4T/  policy. 

of  war  is  at  once  comprehensive  and  complicated.  It  demands 
much  previous  study,  and  the  possession  of  it  in  its  most  improved 
and  perfect  state  is  alvrays  of  great  moment  to  the  security  of  a 
nation. 


JOHN  ADAMS. 

Maij  16,  1797. 
Naval  power  is  the  natural  defense  of  the  United  States. 

December  8,  1798. 

In  demonstrating  by  our  conduct  that  we  do  not  fear  war  for  the 
necessary  protection  of  our  rights  and  honor,  we  shall  give  no  room 
to  infer  that  we  abandon  the  desire  of  peace.  Efficient  preparation 
for  war  can  alone  insure  peace. 

The  beneficial  effects  of  the  small  naval  armament  provided  under 
the  acts  of  the  last  session  are  known  and  acknowledged.  Perhaps 
no  country  ever  experienced  more  sudden  and  remarkable  advan- 
tages from  any  measure  of  policy  than  we  have  derived  from  the 
arming  of  our  maritime  protection  and  defense.  We  ought  without 
loss  of  time  to  lay  the  foundation  for  an  increase  of  our  Navy  to  a 
size  sufficient  to  guard  our  coast  and  protect  our  trade.  Such  a  naval 
force  would  afford  the  best  means  of  general  defense. 

Decemher  3,  1799. 

A  steady  perseverance  in  a  system  of  national  defense  commensu- 
rate with  our  resources  and  the  situation  of  our  country  is  an  obvious 
dictate  of  wisdom,  for  nothing  short  of  the  power  of  repelling 
aggression  will  secure  to  our  country  a  rational  prospect  of  escap- 
ing the  calamities  of  war  or  national  degradation. 


November  27,  1800. 

A  Navy,  well  organized,  must  constitute  the  natural  and  efficient 
defense  of  this  country  against  all  foreign  hostility. 


JAMES  MADISON. 

May  25,  1813. 

The  brilliant  achievements  of  our  infant  Navy  claim  the  highest 
praise  and  the  full  recompense  provided  by  Congress. 


AMERICA]^ 'xxviiL  fxtt^;^:/.  \\\  \  /-,  5 

December  -5,  1815. 

The  signal  services  which  have  been  rendered  by  our  Navy  and  the 
capacities  it  has  developed  for  successful  cooperation  in  the  national 
defense  will  give  to  that  portion  of  the  public  force  its  full  value 
in  the  eyes  of  Congress.  To  preserve  the  ships  we  now  have  in  a 
sound  state,  to  complete  those  already  contemplated,  to  provide 
amply  for  prompt  augmentations,  is  dictated  by  the  soundest  policy. 


JAMES  MONROE. 

January  SO  182Jf. 

In  the  late  war  our  whole  coast  was  either  invaded  or  menaced  with 
invasion.  There  was  scarcely  a  harbor  or  city  on  any  of  our  great 
inlets  which  could  be  considered  secure.  In  whatever  direction  the 
enemy  chose  to  move  with  their  squadrons  and  to  land  their  troops, 
our  fortifications,  where  any  existed,  presented  but  little  obstacle  to 
them.  Their  squadrons,  in  fact,  annoyed  our  whole  coast,  not  of 
the  sea  only  but  every  bay  and  great  river  throughout  its  whole 
extent.  In  entering  these  inlets  and  sailing  up  them  with  a  small 
force  the  effect  was  disastrous,  since  it  never  failed  to  draw  out  the 
whole  population  on  each  side  and  to  keep  it  in  -the  field  while  the 
squadron  remained  there.  The  expense  and  exposure  of  the  inhab- 
itants and  the  waste  of  property  may  readily  be  conceived.  These 
occurrences  demonstrate  clearly  that  in  the  wars  of  other  powers  we 
can  rely  only  on  force  for  the  protection  of  our  neutral  rights,  and 
that  in  any  war  in  which  we  may  be  engaged  hereafter  with  a  strong 
naval  power  the  expense,  waste,  and  other  calamities  attending  it, 
considering  the  vast  extent  of  our  maritime  frontier,  can  not  fail, 
unless  it  be  defended  by  adequate  fortifications  and  a  suitable  naval 
force,  to  correspond  with  those  which  were  experienced  in  the  late 
war.  Two  great  objects  are  therefore  to  be  regarded  in  the  establish- 
ment of  an  adequate  naval  force:  The  first  to  prevent  war  so  far 
as  it  may  be  practicable ;  the  second  to  diminish  its  calamities  when 
it  may  be  inevitable.  No  government  will  be  disposed  to  violate  our 
rights  if  it  knows  we  have  the  means  and  are  prepared  and  resolved 
to  defend  them. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS. 

December  6^  1825. 

A  military  marine  is  the  only  arm  by  which  our  power  can  be  esti- 
mated or  felt  by  foreign  nations,  and  the  only  standing  military 
force  which  can  never  be  dangerous  to  our  own  liberty.    A  perma- 


6  /.  :  *.;:  •A2vifiMf;j\.N:  i^^AVAL  policy. 

nent  naval  peace  establishment,  adapted  to  our  present  condition  and 
adaptable  to  that  gigantic  growth  with  which  the  Nation  is  ad- 
vancing in  its  career  is  among  the  subjects  which  have  already  occu- 
pied the  foresight  of  the  last  Congress.  Our  Navy,  commenced  upon 
a  scale  commensurate  with  the  incipient  energies,  the  scanty  re- 
sources, and  the  comparative  indigence  of  our  infancy,  was  even 
then  found  adequate  to  cope  with  the  powers  of  Barbary  and  with 
one  of  the  principal  maritime  powers  of  Europe. 

At  a  period  of  further  advancement,  but  with  little  accession  of 
strength,  it  has  not  only  sustained  with  honor  the  most  unequal  of 
conflicts  but  covered  itself  and  our  country  with  unfading  glory. 
But  it  is  only  since  the  close  of  the  late  war  that  by  the  numbers  and 
force  of  the  ships  of  which  it  was  composed  it  could  deserve  the  name 
of  a  Navy. 


^December  5,  1826. 

We  have  12  line-of -battle  ships,^  20  frigates,  and  sloops  of  war  in 
proportion,  which,  with  a  few  months  of  preparation,  may  present 
a  line  of  floating  fortifications  along  the  whole  range  of  our  coast. 
Combined  with  a  system  of  fortifications  upon  the  shores  themselves, 
it  has  placed  in  our  possession  the  most  effective  sinews  of  war  and 
has  left  us  at  once  an  example  and  a  lesson  from  which  our  own 
duties  may  be  inferred.  The  gradual  increase  of  the  Navy  was  the 
principle  of  which  the  act  of  29th  April,  1816  was  the  development. 
It  was  the  introduction^  of  a  system  to  act  upon  the  character  and 
history  of  our  own  country  for  an  indefinite  series  of  ages.  It  was 
a  declaration  of  that  Congress  to  their  constituents  and  to  posterity 
that  it  was  the  destiny  and  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  become 
in  regular  process  of  time  and  by  no  petty  advances  a  great  naval 
power. 


ANDREW  JACKSON. 

March  ^,  1829. 

The  increase  of  our  Navy,  whose  flag  has  displayed  in  distant 
climes  our  skill  in  navigation  and  our  fame  in  arms;  the  preserva- 

2  Relatively  to  our  siae,  and  to  the  navies  of  other  nations,  this  was  a  much  larger 
naval  force  than  we  have  now ;  and  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War  in  1861  we  were 
still  relatively  more  powerful  at  sea  than  we  are  now.  As  regards  men  to  draw  on  for 
manning  our  ships,  we  no  longer  have  the  great  maritime  commerce  and  fishing  fleets 
we  then  had ;  but  we  now  have,  what  we  then  did  not,  the  men  who  work  on  the  waters 
of  the  Great  Lakes,  and  even  of  the  rivers  of  the  West,  on  whom  we  can  also  draw  largely  ; 
and  though  our  men  must  still  be  seamen  to  be  efllcient  on  board  ship,  and  though  they 
require  a  longer  time  than  ever  to  learn  their  duties  as  men-of-warsmen,  the  gap  between 
the  seaman  and  the  man  ashore  is  no  longer  so  wide  as  it  was. 


AMERic a'^^  >  ^^Ay^x  \ y^bLit^l '.  '^  -  '^  ^'  ^ '^  7 

tion  of  our  forts,  arsenals,  and  dock  yards ;  and  the  introduction  of 
progressive  improvements  in  the  discipline  and  science  of  both 
branches  of  our  military  service,  are  so  plainly  prescribed  by  pru- 
dence that  I  should  be  excused  for  omitting  their  mention  sooner 
than  for  enlarging  on  their  importance. 


December  8, 1829.      . 

Constituting,  as  the  Navy  does,  the  best  standing  security  of  this 
country  against  foreign  aggression,  it  claims  the  especial  attention 
of  Government,  and  should  continue  to  be  cherished  as  the  offspring 
of  our  national  experience. 


March  i,  1837. 

No  nation,  however  desirous  of  peace,  can  hope  to  escape  occasional 
collisions  with  other  powers,  and  the  soundest  dictates  of  policy  re- 
quire that  we  should  place  ourselves  in  a  position  to  assert  our  rights 
if  a  resort  to  force  should  ever  become  necessary.  Our  local  situa- 
tion, our  long  line  of  seacoast,  indented  by  numerous  bays,  with  deep 
rivers  opening  into  the  interior,  as  well  as  our  extended  and  still 
increasing  commerce,  point  to  the  Navy  as  our  national  means  of  de- 
fense. It  will  in  the  end  be  found  to  be  the  cheapest  and  most 
effectual,  and  now  is  the  time,  in  a  season  of  peace,  that  we  can  year 
after  year  add  to  its  strength  without  increasing  the  burdens  of  the 
people.  It  is  your  true  policy,  for  your  Navy  will  not  only  protect 
your  rich  and  flourishing  commerce  in  distant  seas,  but  will  enable 
you  to  reach  and  annoy  the  enemy,  and  will  give  to  defense  its  great- 
est efjiciency  hy  meeting  danger  at  a  distance  from  home.^  It  is  im- 
possible by  any  line  of  fortification  to  guard  every  point  from  attack 
against  a  hostile  force  advancing  from  the  ocean  and  selecting  its 
object,  but  they  are  indispensable  to  protect  cities  from  bombard- 
ment, dockyards  and  naval  arsenals  from  destruction,  to  give  shelter 
to  merchant  vessels  in  time  of  war  and  to  single  ships  or  weaker 
squadrons  when  pressed  by -superior  force.  Fortifications  of  this 
description  can  not  be  too  soon  completed  and  armed  and  placed  in 
a  condition  of  the  most  perfect  preparation.  The  abundant  means 
we  now  possess  can  not  be  applied  in  any  manner  more  useful  to 
the  country,  and  when  this  is  done  and  our  naval  force  sufficiently 
strengthened  we  need  not  fear  that  any  nation  will  wantonly  insult 
us  or  needlessly  provoke  hostilities.  We  shall  more  certainly  pre- 
serve peace  when  it  is  well  understood  that  we  are  prepared  for  war. 

'  The  italics  are  my  own, 
104147—22 2 


8  :•  •. :  ;•• ;  A'i^^siti??:^.  •^•aVav  policy. 

JOHN  TYLER. 

Decemher  7,  18 Jf.!. 

Every  effort  will  be  made  to  add  to  the  efficiency  of  the  Navy,  and 
1  can  not  too  strongly  urge  upon  you  liberal  appropriations  to  that 
branch  of  the  public  service.  Our  extended  and  otherwise  exposed 
maritime  frontier  calls  for  protection,  to  the  furnishing  of  which 
an  efficient  naval  force  is  indispensable.  We  look  to  no  foreign  con- 
quests, nor  do  we  propose  to  enter  into  competition  with  any  other 
nation  for  supremacy  on  the  ocean;  but  it  is  due  not  only  to  the 
honor  but  to  the  security  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  that  no 
nation  should  be  permitted  to  invade  our  waters  at  pleasure.  Parsi- 
mony alone  would  suggest  the  withholding  of  the  necessary  means 
for  the  protection  of  our  domestic  firesides  from  invasion  and  our 
national  honor  from  disgrace.  I  would  most  earnestly  recommend 
the  increase  and  prompt  equipment  of  that  gallant  Navy  which  has 
lighted  up  every  sea  with  its  victories  and  spread  an  imperishable 
glory  over  the  country. 

JAMES  K.  POLK. 

December  ^,  ISJ^o. 

Our  reliance  for  protection  and  defense  on  the  land  must  be  mainly 
on  our  citizen  soldiers,  who  will  be  ever  ready,  as  they  ever  have 
been  ready  in  time  past,  to  rush  with  alacrity,  at  the  call  of  their 
country  to  her  defense.  This  description  of  force,  however,  can  not 
defend  our  coast,  harbors,  and  inland  seas,  nor  protect  our  com- 
merce on  the  ocean  or  the  lakes.  These  mvist  be  protected  by  our 
Navy. 

Considering  an  increased  naval  force,  and  especially  steam  ves- 
sels, corresponding  with  our  growth  and  importance  as  a  nation, 
and  proportioned  to  the  increased  and  increasing  naval  power  of 
other  nations,  of  vast  importance  as  regards  our  safety,  and  the  great 
and  growing  interests  to  be  protected  by  it,  I  recommend  the  subject 
to  the  favorable  consideration  of  Congress. 


ABRAHAM   LINCOLN. 

Decemher  8, 186S. 

The  duties  devolving  on  the  naval  branch  of  the  service  during 
the  year,  and  throughout  the  whole  of  this  unhappy  contest,  have 
been  discharged  with  fidelity  and  eminent  success. 


AMERICA:^  NAVAL  j^i^cyI}  :\: ;/  9 

The  events  of  the  war  gi\e  an  increased  interest  and  importance 
to  the  Navy,  which  will  probably  extend  beyond  the  war  itself. 

Ihe  armored  vessels  in  our  Navy,  completed  and  in  service, 
or  which  are  under  contract  and  approaching  completion,  are  be- 
lieved to  exceed  in  number  those  of  any  other  power.  But  while 
these  may  be  relied  upon  for  harbor  defense  and  coast  service,  others 
of  <i:reater  strength  and  capacity  will  be  necessary  for  cruising  pur- 
poses and  to  maintain  our  rightful  position  on  the  ocean. 

No  inconsiderable  embarrassment,  delay,  and  public  injur^^  have 
been  experienced  from  the  want  of  governmental  establishments 
(sufficient  in  number  and  adequate  in  character)  for  the  construction 
and  necessary  repair  of  modern  naval  vessels.  I  think  it  my  duty 
to  invite  your  special  attention  to  this  subject.  Satisfactory  and 
important  as  have  been  the  performances  of  the  heroic  men  of  the 
Navy,  they  are  scarcely  more  wonderful  than  the  success  of  our  me- 
chanics and  artisans  in  the  production  of  war  vessels  which  have 
created  a  new  form  of  naval  power. 

I  commend  to  your  consideration  the  policy  of  fostering  and  train- 
ing seamen  for  the  naval  service. 


U.  S.  GRANT. 

December  5, 1870. 

The  appropriations  made  for  the  last  and  current  years  were  evi- 
dently intended  by  Congress,  and  are  sufficient  only,  to  keep  the 
Navy  on  its  present  footing  by  the  repairing  and  refitting  of  our 
old  ships.  This  policy  must,  of  course,  gradually  but  surely  destroy 
the  Navy.  It  can  hardly  be  wise  statesmanship  in  a  Government 
which  represents  a  country  with  over  5,000  miles  of  coast  line  on 
both  oceans,  exclusive  of  Alaska,  and  containing  40,000,000  of  pro- 
gressive people,  with  relations  of  every  nature  with  almost  every 
foreign  country,  to  rest  with  such  inadequate  means  of  enforcing  any 
foreign  policy  either  of  protection  or  redress.  Separated  by  the 
ocean  from  the  nations  of  the  Eastern  Continent,  our  Navy  is  our 
only  means  of  direct  protection  to  our  citizens  abroad,  or  for  the 
enforcement  of  any  foreign  policy. 


December  2. 1872. 


Unless  early  steps  are  taken  to  preserve  our  Navy,  in  a  very  few 
years  the  United  States  will  be  the  weakest  nation,  upon  the  ocean, 
of  all  great  powers.  With  an  energetic,  progressive,  business  people 
like  ours,  penetrating  and  forming  business  relations  with  every  part 


10  >\:  >':  k^feKl*QA::^^.J]$^AY4V  POLICY. 

of  the  known  world,  a  Navy  strong  enough  to  command  the  respect 
of  our  flag  abroad  is  necessary  for  the  full  protection  of  all  tWs^r 
rights. 


December  2, 1873. 

The  distressing  occurrences  which  have  taken  place  in  the  waters 
of  the  Caribbean  Sea,  almost  on  our  very  seaboard,  illustrate  most 
forcibly  the  necessity  always  existing  that  a  Nation  situated  like  ours 
hhould  maintain  in  a  state  of  possible  efficiency  a  Navy  adequate  to 
its  responsibilities.  Congress  should  provide  adequately  not  only 
for  the  present  preparation  but  for  the  future  maintenance  of  our 
naval  force. 


CHESTER  A.  ARTHUR. 

December  6,  1881. 


I  can  not  too  strongly  urge  upon  you  my  conviction  that  every  con- 
sideration of  national  safety,  economy,  and  honor  imperatively  de- 
mands a  thorough  rehabilitation  of  our  Navy. 

With  a  full  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  this  must  involve  a  large 
expenditure  of  the  public  moneys,  I  earnestly  recommend  such  appro- 
priations as  will  accomplish  an  end  which  seems  to  me  so  desirable. 

Nothing  can  be  more  inconsistent  with  true  public  economy  than 
withholding  the  means  necessary  to  accomplish  the  objects  intrusted 
by  the  Constitution  to  the  National  Legislature.  One  of  these  ob- 
jects, which  is  of  paramount  importance,  is  declared  by  our  funda- 
mental law  to  be  the  provision  for  the  "  common  defense."  Surely 
nothing  is  more  essential  to  the  defense  of  the  United  States  and  of 
all  our  people  than  the  efficiency  of  our  Navy. 

If  we  heed  the  teachings  of  history  we  shall  not  forget  that  in  the 
life  of  every  nation  emergencies  may  arise  when  a  resort  to  arms  can 
alone  save  it  from  dishonor. 


Deceinber  4,  188S. 

The  work  of  strengthening  our  Navy  by  the  construction  of  mod- 
ern vessels  has  been  auspiciously  begun. 

That  our  naval  strength  should  be  made  adequate  for  the  defense 
of  our  harbors,  the  protection  of  our  commercial  interests,  and  the 
maintenance  of  pur  national  honor  is  a  proposition  from  which  no 
patriotic  citizen  can  withhold  his  assent. 


AMERICAX    XAVAL   POLICY.  11 

Decemher  1,  ISSJ^. 

I  can  not  too  strongly  urge  the  duty  of  restoring  our  Navy  as 
rapidly  as  possible  to  the  high  state  of  efficiency  Avhich  formerly 
characterized  it.  As  the  long  peace  that  has  lulled  us  into  a  state  of 
fancied  security  may  at  any  time  be  disturbed,  it  is  plain  that  the 
j)olicy  of  strengthening  this  arm  of  the  service  is  dictated  by  con- 
siderations of  wise  economy,  of  just  regard  for  our  future  tranquility, 
juid  of  true  appreciation  of  the  dignity  and  honor  of  the  Republic. 


GROVER  CLEVELAND. 

Decemher  8,  1885. 

All  must  admit  the  importance  of  an  effective  Navy  to  a  Nation 
like  ours.  Yet  we  have  not  a  single  vessel  of  war  that  could  keep  the 
seas  against  a  first-class  vessel  of  any  important  power.  Such  a  con- 
dition ought  not  longer  to  continue.  The  nation  that  can  not  resist 
aggression  is  constantly  exposed  to  it.  Its  foreign  policy  is  of  neces- 
sity weak,  and  its  negotiations  are  conducted  with  disadvantage 
because  it  is  not  in  condition  to  enforce  the  terms  dictated  by  its 
sense  of  right  and  justice. 


BENJAMIN  HARRISON. 

Decemher  9,  1891. 

When  ]t  is  recollected  that  tlie  work  of  building  a  modern  Navy 
was  only  initiated  in  the  year  1883,  that  our  naval  constructors  and 
shipbuilders  were  practically  without  experience  in  the  construction 
of  large  iron  and  steel  ships,  that  our  engine  shops  were  unfamiliar 
with  great  marine  engines,  and  that  the  manufacture  of  steel  forg- 
ings  for  guns  and  plates  was  almost  wholly  a  foreign  industry,  the 
progress  that  has  been  made  is  not  only  highly  satisfactory,  but  fur- 
nishes the  assurance  that  the  United  States  will  before  long  attain, 
in  the  construction  of  such  vessels,  with  their  engines  and  armaments, 
the  same  preeminence  which  it  attained  when  the  best  instrument  of 
ocean  commerce  was  the  clipper  ship,  and  the  most  impressive  exhibit 
of  naval  power  the  old  wooden  three-decker  man-of-war.  The  offi- 
cers of  the  Navy  and  the  proprietors  and  engineers  of  our  great  pri- 
vate shops  have  responded  with  wonderful  intelligence  and  profes- 
sional zeal  to  the  confidence  expressed  by  Congress  in  its  liberal 
legislation. 


12  AMERICAN   NAVAL  POLICY. 

There  should  be  no  hesitation  in  promptly  completing  a  Navy  of 
the  best  modern  type,  large  enough  to  enable  this  country  to  display 
its  flag  in  all  seas  for  the  protection  of  its  citizens  and  its  extending 
commerce.  It  is  essential  to  the  dignity  of  this  Nation  and  to  that 
peaceful  influence  which  it  should  exercise  on  this  hemisphere  that 
its  Navy  should  be  adequate,  both  upon  the  shores  of  the  Atlantic 
and  of  the  Pacific. 


December  6,  1892. 

I  earnestly  express  the  hope  that  the  work  w^hich  has  made  such 
noble  progress  may  not  now  be  stayed.  The  wholesome  influence  for 
peace  and  the  increased  sense  of  security  which  our  citizens  domiciled 
in  other  lands  feel  when  these  magnificent  ships  under  the  American 
flag  appear  is  already  most  gratefully  apparent.  The  United  States 
is  again  a  naval  power. 


GROVER  CLEVELAND. 

December  S.  1894. 

If  we  are  to  have  a  Navy  for  war-like  operations,  ofl'ensive  and 
defensive,  we  certainly  ought  to  increase  both  the  number  of  battle- 
ships and  torpedo  boats. 


December  3,  1894. 

During  the  past  fiscal  year  there  has  been  an  unusual  and  press- 
ing demand  in  many  quarters  of  the  world  for  the  presence  of  vessels 
to  guard  American  interests. 


December  7,  1896. 

The  War  College  has  developed  into  an  institution  which  it  is  be- 
lieved will  be  of  great  value  to  the  Navy  in  teaching  the  science  of 
war,  as  well  as  in  stimulating  the  professional  zeal  in  the  Navy,  and  it 
will  be  especially  useful  in  the  devising  of  plans  for  the  utilization, 
in  case  of  necessity,  of  all  the  naval  resources  of  the  United  States. 

Discipline  among  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Navy  has  been  main- 
tained to  a  high  standard,  and  the  percentage  of  American  citizens 
enlisted  has  been  very  much  increased. 

The  Naval  Militia,  which  was  authorized  a  few  years  ago  as  an 
experiment,  has  now  developed  into  a  body  of  enterprising  young  men, 
active  and  energetic  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties  and  promising 


AMERICAN    NAVAL   POLICY.  '  13 

great  usefulness.  This  establishment  has  nearly  the  same  relation 
to  our  Navy  as  the  National  Guard  in  the  different  States  bears  to 
our  Army,  and  it  constitutes  a  source  of  supply  for  our  naval  forces, 
the  importance  of  which  is  immediately  apparent. 


WILLIAM  McKINLEY. 

December  6,  1897. 

The  great  increase  of  the  Navy  which  has  taken  place  in  recent 
years  was  justified  by  the  requirements  for  national  defense,  and  has 
received  public  approbation.  The  time  has  now  arrived,  however, 
when  this  increase,  to  which  the  country  is  committed,  should  for  a 
time  take  the  form  of  increased  facilities  commensurate  with  the 
increase  of  our  naval  vessels.  It  is  an  unfortunate  fact  that  there 
is  only  one  dock  on  the  Pacific  coast  capable  of  docking  our  largest 
ships,  and  only  one  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  and  that  the  latter  has  for 
the  last  six  or  seven  months  been  under  repair  and,  therefore,  in- 
capable of  use.  Immediate  steps  should  be  taken  to  provide  three  or 
four  docks  of  this  capacity  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  at  least  one  of  the 
Pacific  coast,  and  a  floating  dock  in  the  Grulf.  This  is  the  recom- 
mendation of  a  very  competent  board,  appointed  to  investigate  the 
subject.  There  should  also  be  ample  provision  made  for  powder 
and  projectiles  and  other  munitions  of  war,  and  for  an  increased 
number  of  officers  and  enlisted  men.  Some  additions  are  also  neces- 
sary to  our  navy  yards,  for  the  repair  and  care  of  our  large  number 
of  vessels. 


March  ^,  1897. 

Commendable  progress  has  been  made  of  late  years  in  the  upbuild- 
ing of  the  American  Navy,  but  we  must  supplement  these  efforts 
by  providing  as  a  proper  consort  for  it  a  merchant  marine  amply 
sufficient  for  our  own  carrying  trade  to  foreign  countries.  The 
question  is  one  that  appeals  both  to  our  business  necessities  and  the 
patriotic  aspirations  of  a  great  people. 


December  5, 1899. 

The  expense  is  as  nothing  compared  to  the  advantage  to  be 
achieved.  The  reestablishment  of  our  merchant  marine  involves 
in  a  large  measure  our  continued  industrial  progress  and  the  ex- 
tension of  our  commercial  triumphs.     I  am  satisfied  the  judgment 


14  AMERICAN    XAVAL   POLICY.       " 

of  the  countr3r  favors  the  policy  of  aid  to  our  merchant  marine, 
^vhicli  will  broaden  our  commerce  and  markets  and  upbuild  our 
sea  carrying  capacity  for  the  products  of  agriculture  and  manufac- 
ture; which,  with  the  increase  of  our  Navy,  means  more  work  and 
wages  to  our  countrymen,  as  well  as  a  safeguard  to  American 
interests  in  every  part  of  the  world. 

The  Navy  has  maintained  the  spirit  and  high  efficiency  which 
have  always  characterized  that  service,  and  has  lost  none  of  the 
gallantry  in  heroic  action  which  has  signalized  its  brilliant  and 
glorious  past.  The  Nation  has  equal  pride  in  its  early  and  later 
achievements.  Its  habitual  readiness  for  every  emergency  has  won 
the  confidence  and  admiration  of  the  country.  The  peoi)le  are 
interested  in  the  continued  preparation  and  prestige  of  the  Navy 
and  will  justify  liberal  appropriations  for  its  maintenance  and  im- 
provement. The  officers  have  shown  peculiar  adaptation  for  the 
performance  of  new  and  delicate  duties  which  our  recent  war  has 
imposed. 


December  3,  1900. 

American  vessels  during  the  past  three  years  liave  carried  about 
9  per  cent  of  our  exports  and  imports.  Foreign  sliips  should  carry 
the  least,  not  the  greatest,  part  of  American  trade.  The  remarkable 
growth  of  our  steel  industries,  the  progress  of  shipbuilding  for  the 
domestic  trade,  and  our  steadily  maintained  expenditures  for  the 
^^avy  have  created  an  opportunity  to  place  the  United  States  in  the 
first  rank  of  commercial  maritime  powers. 

Besides  realizing  a  proper  national  aspiration  this  will  mean  tlie 
establishment  and  health}^  growth  along  all  our  coasts  of  a  dis- 
tinctive national  industry,  expanding  the  field  for  the  profitable 
employment  of  labor  and  capital.  It  will  increase  the  transporta- 
tion facilities  and  reduce  freight  charges  on  the  vast  volume  of 
products  brought  from  the  interior  to  the  seaboard  for  export,  and 
will  strengthen  an  arm  of  the  national  defense  upon  which  the 
founders  of  the  Government  and  their  successors  have  relied.  In 
again  urging  immediate  action  by  the  Congress  on  measures  to 
promote  American  shipping  and  foreign  trade,  I  direct  attention 
to  the  recommendations  on  the  subject  in  previous  messages,  and 
particularly  to  the  opinion  expressed  in  the  message  of  1899 : 

I  am  satisfied  the  jiidj^ruifiit  of  the  oonntry  favors  the  policy  of  aid  to  our 
merchant  marine,  which  will  broaden  our  conunerce  and  markets  and  upbuihi 
our  sea  carrying  capacity  for  the  i)roducts  of  ajiriculture  and  manufacture, 
which,  with  the  increase  of  our  Navy,  mean  more  work  and  A\affes  to  our 
countrymen  as  well  as  a  safeguard  to  American  interests  in  every  part  of  the 
world. 

I  commend  also  the  establishment  of  ;i  national  naval  i-eserve.     *     ■'     * 


AMKHICAX    NAVAL   POLICY.  15 

THEODORE  ROOSEVELT. 

Deceniber  3.  1901. 


The  work  of  upbuilding  the  Navy  must  be  steadily  continued.  No 
one  point  of  our  policy,  foreign  or  domestic,  is  more  important  than 
this  to  the  honor  and  material  Avelfare,  and,  above  all,  to  the  peace 
of  our  Nation  in  the  future.  Whether  we  desire  it  or  not,  we  must 
henceforth  recognize  that  we  have  international  duties  no  less  than 
international  rights.  Even  if  our  flag  were  hauled  down  in  the  Phil- 
ippines and  Puerto  Kico,  even  if  we  decided  not  to  build  the  Isth- 
mian Canal,  we  should  need  a  thoroughly  trained  Navy  of  adequate 
size,  or  else  be  prepared  definitely  and  for  all  time  to  abandon  the 
idea  that  our  Nation  is  among  those  whose  sons  go  down  to  the  sea 
in  ships.  Unless  our  commerce  is  always  to  be  carried  in  foreign 
bottoms,  we  must  have  war  craft  to  protect  it. 

Inasmuch,  however,  as  the  American  people  have  no  thought  of 
abandoning  the  path  upon  which  they  have  entered,  and  especially 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  building  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  is  fast 
becoming  one  of  the  matters  which  the  whole  people  are  united  in 
demanding,  it  is  imperative  that  our  Navy  should  be  put  and  kept  in 
the  highest  state  of  efficiency,  and  should  be  made  to  answer  to  our 
growing  needs.  So  far  from  being  in  any  way  a  provocation  to  war, 
an  adequate  and  highly  trained  Navy  is  the  best  guaranty  against 
war,  the  cheapest  and  most  effective  peace  insurance.  The  cost  of 
building  and  maintaining  such  a  navy  represents  the  very  lightest 
premium  for  insuring  peace  which  this  Nation  can  possibly  pay. 

Probably  no  other  great  nation  in  the  world  is  so  anxious  for  peace 
as  we  are.  There  is  not  a  single  civilized  power  which  has  anything 
whatever  to  fear  from  aggressiveness  on  our  part.  All  we  want  is 
peace;  and  toward  this  end  we  wish  to  be  able  to  secure  the  same 
respect  for  our  rights  from  others  which  we  are  eager  and  anxious 
to  extend  to  their  rights  in  return,  to  insure  fair  treatment  to  us 
commercially,  and  to  guarantee  the  safety  of  the  American  people. 

Our  people  intend  to  abide  by  the  Monroe  doctrine  and  to  insist 
upon  it  as  the  one  sure  means  of  securing  the  peace  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  The  Navy  offers  us  the  only  means  of  making  our  in- 
sistence upon  the  Monroe  doctrine  anything  but  a  subject  of  derision 
to  whatever  nation  chooses  to  disregard  it.  We  desire  the  peace 
which  comes  as  of  right  to  tiie  just  man  armed;  not  the  peace  granted 
on  terms  of  ignominy  to  the  craven  and  the  weakling. 

It  is  not  possible  to  improvise  a  Navy  after  war  breaks  out.  The 
ships  must  be  built  and  the  men  trained  long  in  advance.  Some 
auxiliarv  vessels  can  be  turned  into  makeshifts  which  will  do  in  de- 


16  AMERICAN    XAVAL   POLICY. 

fault  of  any  better  for  the  minor  work,  and  a  proportion  of  raw  men 
can  be  mixed  with  the  highly  trained,  their  shortcomings  being 
made  good  by  the  skill  of  their  fellows;  but  the  efficient  fighting 
force  of  the  Navy  when  pitted  against  an  equal  opponent  will  be 
found  almost  exclusively  in  the  warships  that  have  been  regularly 
built  and  in  the  officers  and  men  who  through  years  of  faithful  per- 
formance of  sea  duty  have  been  trained  to  handle  their  formidable 
but  complex  and  delicate  weapons  with  the  highest  efficiency.  '  In  the 
late  War  with  Spain  the  ships  that  dealt  the  decisive  blows  at  Manila 
and  Santiago  had  been  launched  from  2  to  14  years,  and  they  were 
able  to  do  as  they  did  because  the  men  in  the  conning  towers,  the 
gun  turrets,  and  the  engine  rooms  had  through  long  years  of  prac- 
tice at  sea  learned  how  to  do  their  duty. 

While  awarding  the  fullest  honor  to  the  men  who  actually  com- 
manded and  manned  the  ships  which  destroyed  the  Spanish  sea 
forces  in  the  Philippines  and  in  Cuba,  we  must  not  forget  that  an 
equal  meed  of  praise  belongs  to  those  without  whom  neither  blow 
could  have  been  struck.  The  Congressmen  who  voted  years  in  ad- 
vance the  money  to  lay  down  the  ships,  to  build  the  guns,  to  buy  the 
armor  plate;  the  department  officials  and  the  business  men  and 
wageworkers  who  furnished  what  the  Congress  had  authorized;  the 
Secretaries  of  the  Navy  who  asked  for  and  expended  the  appro- 
priations; and  finally  the  officers  who,  in  lair  weather  and  foul, 
on  actual  sea  service,  trained  and  disciplined  the  crews  of  the  ships 
when  there  was  no  war  in  sight — all  are  entitled  to  a  full  share  in 
the  glory  of  Manila  and  Santiago  and  the  respect  accorded  by  every 
true  American  to  those  who  wrought  such  signal  triumph  for  our 
country.  It  was  forethought  and  preparation  which  secured  us  the 
overwhelming  triumph  of  1898.  If  we  fail  to  show  forethought 
and  preparation  now,  there  may  come  a  time  when  disaster  will 
befall  us  instead  of  triumph;  and  should  this  time  come,  the  fault 
will  rest  primarily,  not  upon  those  whom  the  accident  of  events 
puts  in  supreme  command  at  the  moment,  but  upon  those  who  have 
failed  to  prepare  in  advance. 

There  should  be  no  cessation  in  the  work  of  completing  our  Navy. 
So  far  ingenuity  has  been  wholly  unable  to  devise  a  substitute  for 
the  great  war  craft  whose  hammering  guns  beat  out  the  mastery  of 
the  high  seas.  It  is  unsafe  and  unwise  not  to  provide  this  year  for 
several  additional  battleships  and  heavy  armored  cruisers,  with 
auxiliary  and  lighter  craft  in  proportion;  for  the  exact  numbers 
and  character  I  refer  you  to  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
But  there  is  something  we  need  even  more  than  additional  ships, 
and  this  is  additional  officers  and  men.  To  provide  battleships  and 
cruisers  and  then  lay  them  up,  with  the  expectation  of  leaving  them 


AMERICAN   NAVAL   POLICY.  17 

unmanned  until  they  are  needed  in  actual  war,  would  be  worse  than 
folly :  it  would  be  a  crime  against  the  Nation. 

To  send  any  warship  against  a  competent  enemy  unless  those 
aboard  it  had  been  trained  by  years  of  actual  sea  service,  including 
incessant  gunnery  practice,  would  be  to  invite  not  merely  disaster 
but  the  bitterest  shame  and  humiliation.  Four  thousand  addi- 
tional seamen  and  one  thousand  additional  marines  should  be  pro- 
vided; and  an  increase  in  the  officers  should  be  provided  by  mak- 
ing a  large  addition  to  the  classes  at  Annapolis.  There  is  one  small 
matter  which  should  be  mentioned  in  connection  with  Annapolis. 
The  pretentious  and  unmeaning  title  of  "naval  cadet"  should  be 
abolished;  the  title  of  "midshipman,"  full  of  historic  association, 
should  be  restored. 

Even  in  time  of  peace  a  warship  should  be  used  until  it  wears  out, 
for  only  so  can  it  be  kept  fit  to  respond  to  any  emergency.  The 
officers  and  men  alike  should  be  kept  as  much  as  possible  on  blue 
water,  for  it  is  there  only  they  can  learn  their  duties  as  they  should 
be  learned.  The  big  vessels  should  be  maneuvered  in  squadrons  con- 
taining not  merely  battleships,  but  the  necessary  proportion  of  cruis- 
ers and  scouts.  The  torpedo  boats  should  be  handled  by  the  younger 
officers  in  such  manner  as  will  best  fit  the  latter  to  take  responsibility 
and  meet  the  emergencies  of  actual  warfare. 

Every  detail  ashore  which  can  be  performed  by  a  civilian  should 
be  so  performed,  the  officer  being  kept  for  his  special  duty  in  the  sea 
service.  Above  all,  gunnery  practice  should  be  unceasing.  It  is 
important  to  have  our  Navy  of  adequate  size,  but  it  is  even  more 
important  that  ship  for  ship  it  should  equal  in  efficiency  any  navy 
in  the  world.  This  is  possible  only  with  highly  drilled  crews  and 
officers,  and  this  in  turn  imperatively  demands  continuous  and  pro- 
gressive instruction  in  target  practice,  ship  handling,  squadron  tac- 
tics, and  general  discipline.  Our  ships  must  be  assembled  in  squad- 
rons actively  cruising  away  from  harbors  and  never  long  at  anchor. 
The  resulting  wear  upon  engines  and  hulls  must  be  endured ;  a  battle- 
ship worn  out  in  long  training  of  officers  and  men  is  well  paid  for  by 
the  results,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  no  matter  in  how  excellent  con- 
dition, it  is  useless  if  the  crew  be  not  expert. 

We  now  have  17  battleships  appropriated  for,  of  which  9  are  com- 
pleted and  have  been  commissioned  for  actual  service.  The  remain- 
ing 8  will  be  ready  in  from  two  to  four  years,  but  it  will  take  at  least 
that  time  to  recruit  and  train  the  men  to  fight  them.  It  is  of  vast 
concern  that  we  have  trained  crews  ready  for  the  vessels  by  the  time 
they  are  commissioned.  Good  ships  and  good  guns  are  simply  good 
weapons,  and  the  best  are  useless  save  in  the  hands  of  men  who  know 
how  to  fight  with  them.  The  men  must  be  trained  and  drilled  under 
a  thorough  and  well-planned  system  of  progressive  instruction,  while 


18  AMERICAN    NAVAL    POLICY. 

the  recruiting  must  be  carried  on  with  still  greater  vigor.  Every 
effort  must  be  made  to  exalt  the  main  function  of  the  officer — the 
command  of  men.  The  leading  graduates  of  the  Naval  Academy 
should  be  assigned  to  the  combatant  branches,  the  line  and  marines. 

Many  of  the  essentials  of  success  are  already  recognized  by  the 
General  Board,  which,  as  the  central  office  of  a  growing  staff,  is  mov- 
ing steadily  toward  a  proper  war  efficiency  and  a  proper  efficiency  of 
the  whole  Navy,  under  the  Secretary.  This  (leneral  Board,  by  fos- 
tering the  creation  of  a  general  staff,  is  providing  for  the  official  and 
then  the  general  recognition  of  our  altered  conditions  as  a  Nation 
and  of  the  true  meaning  of  a  great  war  fleet,  which  meaning  is.  first, 
the  best  men,  and,  second,  the  best  ships. 

The  Naval  Militia  forces  are  State  organizations  and  are  trained 
for  coast  service,  and  in  event  of  war  they  will  constitute  the  inner 
line  of  defense.  They  should  receive  hearty  encouragement  from  the 
General  Government. 

But  in  addition  we  should  at  once  provicie  for  a  National  Naval 
Reserve,  organized  and  trained  under  the  direction  of  the  Navy  De- 
partment and  subject  to  the  call  of  the  Chief  Executive  whenever  war 
becomes  imminent.  It  should  be  a  real  auxiliary  to  the  naval  sea- 
going peace  establishment  and  offer  material  to  be  drawn  on  at  once 
for  manning  our  ships  in  time  of  Avar.  It  should  be  composed  of 
graduates  of  the  Naval  Academy,  graduates  of  the  Naval  Militia, 
officers  and  crews  of  coast-line  steamers,  longshore  schooners,  fishing 
vessels,  and  steam  yachts,  together  with  the  coast  population  about 
such  centers  as  life-saving  stations  and  lighthouses. 

The  American  people  must  either  build  and  maintain  an  adequate 
Navy  or  else  make  up  their  minds  definitely  to  accept  a  secondary 
position  in  international  affairs,  not  merely  in  political  but  in  com- 
mercial matters.  It  has  been  well  said  that  there  is  no  surer  way 
of  courting  national  disaster  than  to  be  ''  opulent,  aggressive,  and 
unarmed." 


December  2. 1902. 


There  should  be  no  halt  in  the  work  of  building  up  the  Navy,  pro- 
viding every  year  additional  fighting  craft.  We  are  a  very  rich 
country,  vast  in  extent  of  territory,  and  great  in  population;  a 
country,  moreover,  which  has  an  Army  diminutive  indeed  when  com- 
pared with  that  of  any  other  first-class  power.  We  have  deliberately 
made  our  own  certain  foreign  policies  which  demand  the  possession 
of  a  first-class  Navy.  The  Isthmian  Canal  will  greatly  increase  the 
efficiency  of  our  Navy  if  the  Navy  is  of  sufficient  size ;  but  if  we  have 
an  inadequate  nav3%  then  the  building  of  the  canal  would  be  merely 


AMERICAN    NAVAL   POLICY.  .  19 

givin<r  a  hostage  to  any  power  of  superior  strength.  The  Monroe 
doctrine  should  be  treated  as  the  cardinal  feature  of  American  foreign 
policy ;  but  it  would  be  worse  than  idle  to  assert  it  unless  we  intended 
to  back  it  up,  and  it  can  be  backed  up  only  by  a  thoroughly  good 
Navy.  A  good  Navy  is  not  a  provocative  of  war.  It  is  the  surest 
guaranty  of  peace. 

Each  individual  unit  of  our  Navy  should  be  the  most  efficient  of 
its  kind  as  regards  both  material  and  personnel  that  is  to  be  found 
in  the  world.  I  call  your  special  attention  to  the  need  of  providing 
for  the  manning  of  the  ships.  Serious  trouble  threatens  us  if  we 
can  not  do  better  than  we  are  now  doing  as  regards  securing  the 
services  of  a  sufficient  number  of  the  highest  type  of  sailormen,  of 
sea  mechanics.  The  veteran  seamen  of  our  warships  are  of  as  high 
a  type  as  can  be  found  in  any  navy  which  rides  the  waters  of  the 
world;  they  are  unsurpassed  in  daring*  in  resolution,  in  readiness, 
in  thorough  knowledge  of  their  profession.  They  deserve  every  con- 
sideration that  can  be  shown  them.  But  there  are  not  enough  of 
them.  It  is  no  more  possible  to  improvise  a  crew  than  it  is  possible 
to  improvise  a  warship.  To  build  the  finest  ship,  with  the  deadliest 
battery,  and  to  send  it  afloat  with  a  raw  crew,  no  matter  how  brave 
they  were  individually,  would  be  to  insure  disaster  if  a  foe  of  average 
capacity  were  encountered.  Neither  ships  nor  men  can  be  im- 
provised when  war  has  begun.  We  need  a  thousand  additional  offi- 
cers in  order  to  properly  man  the  ships  now  provided  for  and  under 
construction.  The  classes  at  the  Naval  School  at  Annapolis  should 
be  greatly  enlarged.  At  the  same  time  that  we  thus  add  the  officers, 
where  we  need  them,  we  should  facilitate  the  retirement  of  those  at 
the  head  of  the  list  whose  usefulness  has  become  impaired.  Promo- 
tion must  be  fostered  if  the  service  is  to  be  kept  efficient. 

The  lamentable  scarcity  of  officers  and  the  large  number  of  recruits 
and  of  unskilled  men  necessarily  put  aboard  the  new  vessels  as  they 
have  been  commissioned  has  thrown  upon  our  officers,  and  especially 
on  the  lieutenants  and  junior  grades,  unusual  labor  and  fatigue 
and  has  gravely  strained  their  powers  of  endurance.  Nor  is  there 
sign  of  any  immediate  let-up  in  this  strain.  It  must  continue  for 
some  time  longer,  until  more  officers  are  graduated  from  Annapolis 
and  until  the  recruits  become  trained  and  skillful  in  their  duties. 
In  these  difficulties  incident  upon  the  development  of  our  war  fleet 
the  conduct  of  all  our  officers  has  been  creditable  to  the  service,  and 
the  lieutenants  and  junior  grades  in  particular  have  displayed  an 
ability  and  a  steadfast  cheerfulness  which  entitles  them  to  the  un- 
grudging thanks  of  all  who  realize  the  disheartening  trials  and 
fatigues  to  which  they  are  of  necessity  subjected. 

There  is  not  a  cloud  on  the  horizon  at  present.  There  seems  not 
the  slightest  chance  of  trouble  with  a  foreign  power.     We  most 


20  AMERICAN   NAVAL  POLICY. 

earnestly  hope  that  this  state  of  things  may  continue ;  and  the  way 
to  insure  its  continuance  is  to  provide  for  a  thoroughly  efficient  Navy. 
The  refusal  to  maintain  such  a  Navy  would  invite  trouble,  and  if 
trouble  came  would  insure  disaster.  Fatuous  self-complacency  or 
vanity,  or  shortsightedness  in  refusing  to  prepare  for  danger,  is 
both  foolish  and  wicked  in  such  a  Nation  as  ours ;  and  past  experience 
has  shown  that  such  fatuity  in  refusing  to  recognize  or  prepare  for 
any  crises  in  advance  is  usually  succeeded  by  a  mad  panic  of  hys- 
terical fear  once  the  crisis  has  actually  arrived. 


December  7,  1903. 

I  heartil}'-  congratulate  the  Congress  upon  the  stead}^  progress  in 
building  up  the  American  Navy.  We  can  not  afford  a  let-up  in  this 
great  work.  To  stand  still  means  to  go  back.  There  should  be  no 
cessation  in  adding  to  the  effective  units  of  the  fighting  strength  of 
the  fleet.  Meanwhile  the  Navy  Department  and  the  officers  of  the 
Navy  are  doing  well  their  part  by  providing  constant  service  at  sea 
under  conditions  akin  to  those  of  actual  w^arfare.  Our  officers  and 
enlisted  men  are  learning  to  handle  the  battleships,  cruisers,  and  tor- 
pedo boats  with  high  efficiency  in  fleet  and  squadron  formations,  and 
the  standard  of  marksmanship  is  being  steadily  raised.  The  best 
work  ashore  is  indispensable,  but  the  highest  duty  of  a  naval  officer 
is  to  exercise  command  at  sea. 

The  establishment  of  a  naval  base  in  the  Philippines  ought  not  to 
be  longer  postponed.  Such  a  base  is  desirable  in  time  of  peace;  in 
time  of  war  it  would  be  indispensable  and  its  lack  would  be  ruinous. 
Without  it  our  fleet  would  be  helpless.  Our  naval  experts  are  agreed 
that  Subig  Bay  is  the  proper  place  for  the  purpose.  The  national 
interests  require  that  the  work  of  fortification  and  development  of 
a  naval  station  at  Subig  Bay  be  begun  at  an  early  date,  for  under  the 
best  conditions  it  is  a  work  which  will  consume  much  time. 


D^eceinber  4,  WOJ^. 

In  treating  of  our  foreign  policy  and  of  the  attitude  that  this 
great  Nation  should  assume  in  the  world  at  large,  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  consider  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  and  the  Congress, 
through  which  the  thought  of  the  Nation  finds  its  expression,  should 
keep  ever  vividly  in  mind  the  fundamental  fact  that  it  is  impossible 
to  treat  our  foreign  policy,  whether  this  policy  takes  shape  in  the 
effort  to  secure  justice  for  others  or  justice  for  ourselves,  save  as  con- 
ditioned upon  the  attitude  we  are  willing  to  take  toward  our  Army, 
and  especially  toward  our  Navy.    It  is  not  merely  unwise,  it  is  con- 


AMERICAN   NAVAL  POLICY.  21 

temptible  for  a  nation,  as  for  an  individual,  to  use  high-sounding 
language  to  proclaim  its  purposes,  or  to  take  positions  which  are 
ridiculous  if  unsupported  by  potential  force  and  then  to  refuse  to 
provide  this  force.  If  there  is  no  intention  of  providing  and  of 
keeping  the  force  necessary  to  back  up  a  strong  attitude,  then  it  is 
far  better  not  to  assume  such  an  attitude. 

The  strong  arm  of  the  Government  in  enforcing  respect  for  its 
just  rights  in  international  matters  is  the  Navy  of  the  United  States. 
I  most  earnestly  recommend  that  there  be  no  halt  in  the  work  of 
upbuilding  the  American  Navy.  There  is  no  more  patriotic  duty 
before  us  as  a  people  than  to  keep  the  Navy  adequate  to  the  needs 
of  this  country's  position.  We  have  undertaken  to  build  the  Isthmian 
Canal.  We  have  undertaken  to  secure  for  ourselves  our  just  share 
in  the  trade  of  the  Orient.  We  have  undeHaken  to  protect  our 
citizens  from  improper  treatment  in  foreign  lands.  We  continue 
steadily  to  insist  on  the  application  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  to  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  Unless  our  attitude  in  these  and  all  similar 
matters  is  to  be  a  mere  boastful  sham,  we  can  not  afford  to  abandon 
our  naval  programme.  Our  voice  is  now  potent  for  peace,  and  is  so 
potent  because  we  are  not  afraid  of  war.  But  our  protestations 
upon  behalf  of  peace  would  neither  receive  nor  deserve  the  slightest 
attention  if  we  were  impotent  to  make  them  good. 


December  5,  1905. 

We  can  not  consider  the  question  of  our  foreign  policy  without  at 
the  same  time  treating  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy. 

But  it  is,  of  course,  true  that  the  man  behind  the  gun,  the  man  in 
the  engine  room,  and  the  man  in  the  conning  tower,  considered  not 
only  individually,  but  especially  wnth  regard  to  the  way  in  which 
they  work  together,  are  even  more  important  than  the  weapons  with 
which  they  work.  The  most  formidable  battleship  is,  of  course, 
helpless  against  even  a  light  cruiser  if  the  men  aboard  it  are  unable 
to  hit  anything  with  their  guns;  and  thoroughly  well-hafidled 
cruisers  may  count  seriously  in  an  engagement  with  much  superior 
vessels  if  the  men  aboard  the  latter  are  ineffective,  whether  from  lack 
of  training  or  from  any  other  cause.  Modern  warships  are  most 
formidable  mechanisms  when  well  handled,  but  they  are  utterly 
useless  when  not  well  handled,  and  they  can  not  be  handled  at  all 
without  long  and  careful  training.  This  training  can  under  no  cir- 
cumstances be  given  when  once  war  has  broken  out.  No  fighting 
ship  of  the  first  class  should  ever  be  laid  up  save  for  necessary  re- 
pairs ;  and  her  crew  should  be  kept  constantly  exercised  on  the  high 


22  AMERICAN    NAVAL   POLICY. 

seas,  so  that  she  may  stand  at  the  highest  point  of  perfection.  To 
put  a  new  and  untrained  crew  upon  the  most  powerful  battleship 
and  send  it  out  to  meet  a  formidable  enemy  is  not  only  to  invite 
but  to  insure  disaster  and  disgrace.  To  improvise  crews  at  the  out- 
break of  a  war,  so  far  as  the  serious  fighting  craft  are  concerned,  is 
absolutely  hopeless.  If  the  officers  and  men  are  not  thoroughly 
skilled  in  and  have  not  been  thoroughly  trained  to  their  duties,  it 
would  be  far  better  to  keep  the  ships  in  port  during  hostilities  than 
to  send  them  against  a  formidable  opponent,  for  the  result  could 
only  be  that  they  would  be  either  sunk  or  captured. 


Decemher  3,  1906. 

The  United  States  Navy  is  the  surest  guarantor  of  peace  which  this 
country  possesses.  It  is  earnestly  to  be  wished  that  we  would  profit 
by  the  teachings  of  history  in  this  matter.  A  strong  and  wise  people 
will  study  its  own  failures  no  less  than  its  triumphs,  for  there  is 
wisdom  to  be  learned  from  the  study  of  both,  of  the  mistake  as  well 
as  of  the  success.  For  this  purpose  nothing  could  be  more  instructive 
than  a  rational  study  of  the  War  of  1812,  as  it  is  told,  for  instance, 
by  Capt.  Mahan.  There  was  only  one  way  in  which  that  war 
could  have  been  avoided.  If  during  the  preceding  12  years  a  Navy 
relatively  as  strong  as  that  which  this  country  now  has  had  been 
built  up,  and  an  Army  provided  relatively  as  good  as  that  which 
the  country  now  has,  there  never  would  have  been  the  slightest  neces- 
sity of  fighting  the  war;  and  if  the  necessity  had  arisen  the  war 
would  under  such  circumstances  have  ended  with  our  speedy  and 
overwhelming  triumph.  But  our  people  during  those  12  years  refused 
to  make  any  preparations  whatever  regarding  either  the  Army  or 
the  Navy.  They  saved  a  million  or  two  of  dollars  by  so  doing ;  and 
in  mere  money  paid  a  hundredfold  for  each  million  thus  saved  during 
the  three  years  of  war  which  followed — a  war  which  brought  untold 
suffering  upon  our  people,  which  at  one  time  threatened  the  gravest 
national  disaster,  and  which,  in  spite  of  the  necessity  of  waging  it, 
resulted  merely  in  what  was  in  effect  a  drawn  battle,  while  the  bal- 
ance of  defeat  and  triumph  was  almost  even. 

I  do  not  ask  that  we  continue  to  increase  our  Navy.  I  ask  merely 
that  it  be  maintained  at  its  present  strength;  and  this  can  be  done 
only  if  we  replace  the  obsolete  and  outworn  ships  by  new  and  good 
ones,  the  equals  of  any  afloat  in  any  navy.  To  stop  building  ships 
for  one  year  means  that  for  that  year  the  Navy  goes  back  instead  of 
forward.  The  old  battleship  Texas^  for  instance,  would  now  be  of 
little  service  in  a  stand-up  fight  with  a  powerful  adversary.  The 
old  double-turret  monitors  have  outworn  their  usefulness,  while  it 


AMERICAN    NAVAL   POLICY.  23 

was  a  waste  of  nomey  to  build  the  modern  single-turret  monitors. 
All  these  ships  should  be  replaced  by  others ;  and  this  can  be  done  by 
a  well-settled  program  of  providing  for  the  building  each  year  of  at 
least  one  first-class  battleship,  equal  in  size  and  speed  to  any  that  any 
nation  is  at  the  same  time  building;  the  armament  presumably  to 
consist  of  as  large  a  number  as  possible  of  very  heavy  guns  of  one 
caliber,  together  with  smaller  guns  to  repel  torpedo  attack;  while 
there  should  be  heavy  armor,  turbine  engines,  and,  in  short,  every 
modern  device.  Of  course,  from  time  to  time,  cruisers,  colliers,  tor- 
pedo-boat destroyers,  or  torpedo  boats  will  have  to  be  built  also.  All 
this,  be  it  remembered,  would  not  increase  our  Navy,  but  would 
merely  keep  it  at  its  present  strength.  Equally  of  course  the  ships 
will  be  absolutely  useless  if  the  men  aboard  them  are  not  so  trained 
that  they  can  get  the  best  possible  service  out  of  the  formidable  but 
delicate  and  complicated  mechanisms  intrusted  to  their  care.  The 
marksmanship  of  our  men  has  so  improved  during  the  last  five  years 
that  I  deem  it  within  bounds  to  say  that  the  Navy  is  more  than  twice 
as  efficient,  ship  for  ship,  as  half  a  decade  ago.  The  Navy  can  only 
attain  proper  efficiency  if  enough  officers  and  men  are  provided,  and 
if  these  officers  and  men  are  given  the  chance  (and  required  to  take 
advantage  of  it)  to  stay  continually  at  sea  and  to  exercise  the  fleets 
singly  and  above  all  in  squadron,  the  exercise  to  be  of  every  kind  and 
to  include  unceasing  practice  at  the  guns,  conducted  under  conditions 
that  will  test  marksmanship  in  time  of  war. 

In  both  the  Army  and  the  Navy  there  is  urgent  need  that  every- 
thing possible  should  be  done  to  maintain  the  highest  standard  for 
the  personnel,  alike  as  regards  the  officers  and  the  enlisted  men. 
I  do  not  believe  that  in  any  service  there  is  a  finer  body  of  enlisted 
men  and  of  junior  officers  than  we  have  in  both  the  Army  and  the 
Navy,  including  the  Marine  Corps.  All  possible  encouragment  to 
the  enlisted  men  should  be  given,  in  pay  and  otherwise,  and  every- 
thing practicable  done  to  render  the  service  attractive  to  men  of  the 
right  type.  They  should  be  held  to  the  strictest  discharge  of  their 
duty,  and  in  them  a  spirit  should  be  encouraged  which  demands  not 
the  mere  performance  of  duty,  but  the  performance  of  far  more  than 
duty,  if  it  conduces  to  the  honor  and  the  interests  of  the  American 
Nation;  and  in  return  the  amplest  consideration  should  be  theirs. 


Decemler  3, 1907. 

I  think  it  is  only  lack  of  foresight  that  troubles  us,  not  any  hos- 
tility to  the  Army.  There  are,  of  course,  foolish  people  who  de- 
nounce any  care  of  the  Army  or  Navy  as  "militarism,"  but  I  do  not 
think  that  these  people  are  numerous.    This  country  has  to  contend 


24  AMERICAN    XAVAL   POLICY. 

now,  and  has  had  to  contend  in  the  past,  with  many  evils,  and  there  is 
ample  scope  for  all  who  would  work  for  reform.  But  there  is  not  one 
evil  that  now  exists,  or  that  ever  has  existed  in  this  country,  which  is, 
or  ever  has  been,  owin^  in  the  smallest  part  to  militarism.  Decla- 
mation against  militarism  has  no  more  serious  place  in  an  earnest 
and  intelligent  movement  for  righteousness  in  this  country  than 
declamation  against  the  worship  of  Baal  or  Astaroth.  It  is  decla- 
mation against  a  nonexistent  evil,  one  which  never  has  existed  in 
this  country,  and  w^hich  has  not  the  slightest  chance  of  appearing 
here.  We  are  glad  to  help  in  any  movement  for  international  peace, 
but  this  is  because  we  sincerely  believe  that  it  is  our  duty  to  help 
all  such  movements  provided  they  are  sane  and  rational,  and 
not  because  there  is  any  tendency  toward  militarism  on  our  part 
which  needs  to  be  cured.  The  evils  we  have  to  fight  are  those  in 
connection  with  industrialism,  not  militarism.  Industry  is  always 
necessary,  just  as  war  is  sometimes  necessary. 

It  was  hoped  The  Hague  Conference  might  deal  with  the  ques- 
tion of  the  limitation  of  armaments.  But  even  before  it  had  as- 
sembled informal  inquiries  had  developed  that  as  regards  naval 
armaments,  the  only  ones  in  which  this  country  had  any  interest, 
it  was  hopeless  to  try  to  devise  any  plan  for  which  there  was  the 
slightest  possibility  of  securing  the  assent  of  the  nations  gathered 
at  The  Hague.  No  plan  was  even  proposed  which  would  have  had 
the  assent  of  more  than  one  first-class  power  outside  of  the  United 
States.  The  only  plan  that  seemed  at  all  feasible,  that  of  limiting 
the  size  of  battleships,  met  with  no  favor  at  all.  It  is  evident,  there- 
fore, that  it  is  folly  for  this  Nation  to  base  any  hope  of  securing 
peace  on  any  international  agreement  as  to  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ments. Such  being  the  fact  it  would  be  most  unwise  for  us  to  stop 
the  upbuilding  of  our  Navy.  To  build  one  battleship  of  the  best  and 
most  advanced  type  a  year  would  barely  keep  our  fleet  up  to  its  pres- 
ent force.  This  is  not  enough.  In  my  judgment  w^e  should  this  year 
provide  for  four  battleships.  But  it  is  idle  to  build  battleships  unless 
in  addition  to  providing  the  men  and  the  means  for  thorough  train- 
ing, we  provide  the  auxiliaries  for  them,  unless  we  provide  docks, 
the  coaling  stations,  the  colliers,  and  supply  ships  that  they  need. 
We  are  extremely  deficient  in  coaling  stations  and  docks  on  the 
Pacific,  and  this  deficiency  should  not  longer  be  permitted  to  exist. 
Plenty  of  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers  should  be  built.  Both  on  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts  fortifications  of  the  best  type  should  be 
provided  for  all  our  greatest  harbors. 

We  need  always  to  remember  that  in  time  of  war  the  Navy  is  not 
to  be  used  to  defend  harbors  and  seacoast  cities;  Ave  should  perfect 
our  system  of  coast  fortifications.    The  only  efficient  use  for  the  Navy 


AMERICAN    XAVAL   POLICY.  25 

is  for  offense.  The  only  v^aj  in  which  it  can  efficientl}'  protect  our 
own  coast  against  the  possible  action  of  a  foreign  navy  is  by  destroy- 
ing that  foreign  navy.  For  defense  against  a  hostile  fleet  which 
actualty  attacks  them,  the  coast  cities  must  depend  upon  their  forts, 
mines,  torpedoes,  submarines,  and  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers. 
All  of  these  together  are  efficient  for  defensive  purposes,  but  they 
in  no  way  supply  the  place  of  a  thoroughly  efficient  navy  capable  of 
acting  on  the  offensive;  for  parrying  never  yet  won  a  fight.  It  can 
only  be  won  by  hard  hitting,  and  an  aggressive  seagoing  Navy  alone 
can  do  this  hard  hitting  of  the  offensive  type.  But  the  forts  and 
the  like  are  necessary  so  that  the  Navy  may  be  foot-loose.  In  time 
of  war  there  is  sure  to  be  demand,  under  pressure  of  fright,  for 
the  ships  to  be  scattered  so  as  to  defend  all  kinds  of  ports.  Under 
penalty  of  terrible  disaster,  this  demand  must  be  refused.  The  ships 
must  be  kept  together,  and  their  objective  made  the  enemies'  fleet. 
If  fortifications  are  sufficiently  strong,  no  modern  navy  will  venture 
to  attack  them  so  long  as  the  foe  has  in  existence  a  hostile  navy  of 
anything  like  the  same  size  or  efficiency.  But  unless  there  exists 
si^ch  a  navy  then  the  fortifications  are  powerless  by  themselves  to 
secure  the  victory.  For,  of  course,  the  mere  deficiency  means  that 
any  resolute  enem^^  can  at  his  leisure  combine  all  his  forces  upon 
one  point  with  the  certainty  that  he  can  take  it. 

lentil  our  battle  fleet  is  much  larger  than  at  present  it  should  never 
be  split  into  detachments  so  far  apart  that  they  could  not  in  event 
of  emergency  be  speedily  united.  Our  coast  line  is  on  the  Pacific 
just  as  much  as  on  the  Atlantic.  The  interests  of  California,  Oregon, 
and  Washington  are  as  emphatically  the  interests  of  the  whole  Union 
as  those  of  Maine  and  New  York,  of  Louisiana  and  Texas.  The 
battle  fleet  should  now  and  then  be  moved  to  the  Pacific,  just  as  at 
other  times  it  should  be  kept  in  the  Atlantic.  When  the  Isthmian 
Canal  is  built  the  transit  of  the  battle  fleet  from  one  ocean  to  the 
other  will  be  comparatively  easy.  Until  it  is  built  I  earnestly  hope 
that  the  battle  fleet  will  be  thus  shifted  between  the  two  oceans 
eA'ery  year  or  two.  The  marksmanship  on  all  our  ships  has  improved 
phenomenally  during  the  last  five  years.  Until  within  the  last  two 
or  three  years  it  was  not  possible  to  train  a  battle  fleet  in  squadron 
maneuA'ers  under  service  conditions,  and  it  is  only  during  these  last 
two  or  three  years  that  the  training  under  these  conditions  has  be- 
come really  effective.  Another  and  most  necessary  stride  in  advance 
is  noAv  being  taken.  The  battle  fleet  is  about  starting  by  the  Straits 
of  Magellan  to  visit  the  Pacific  coast.  Sixteen  battleships  are  going 
under  the  command  of  Rear  Admiral  Evans,  while  eight  armored 
cruisers  and  two  other  battleships  will  meet  him  at  San  Francisco, 
whither  certain  torpedo  destroyers  are  also  going.  No  fleet  of  such 
size  has  ever  made  such  a  voyage,  and  it  will  be  of  very  great  edu- 


26  AMEKICAN    NAVAL   POLICY. 

cational  use  to  all  engaged  in  it.  The  only  way  by  which  to  teacli 
officers  and  men  how  to  handle  the  fleet  so  as  to  meet  every  possible 
strain  and  emergency  in  time  of  w^ar  is  to  have  them  practice  under 
similar  conditions  in  time  of  peace.  Moreover,  the  only  way  to  find 
out  our  actual  needs  is  to  perform  in  time  of  peace  wiiatever  ma- 
neuvers might  be  necessary  in  time  of  war.  After  war  is  declared 
it  is  too  late  to  find  out  the  needs ;  that  means  to  invite  disaster. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  everything  done  in  the  Navy  to  fit  It 
to  do  well  in  time  of  war  must  be  done  in  time  of  peace.  Modern 
wars  are  short ;  the}^  do  not  last  the  length  of  time  requisite  to  build 
a  battleship ;  and  it  takes  longer  to  train  the  officers  and  men  to  do 
well  on  a  battleship  than  it  takes  to  build  it.  Nothing  effective  can 
be  done  for  the  Navy  once  war  has  begun,  and  the  result  of  the  war, 
if  the  combatants  are  otherwise  equally  matched,  will  depend  upon 
which  power  has  prepared  best  in  time  of  peace.  The  United  States 
Navy  is  the  best  guaranty  the  Nation  has  that  its  honor  and  interest 
will  not  be  neglected;  and,  in  addition,  it  offers  by  far  the  best 
insurance  for  peace  that  can  by  human  ingenuity  be  devised. 


April  14,  1908. 

I  advocate  that  the  United  States  build  a  Navy  commensurate  with 
its  powers  and  its  needs,  because  I  feel  that  such  a  Navy  will  be  the 
surest  guaranty  and  safeguard  of  peace.  We  are  not  a  military 
nation.  Our  Army  is  so  small  as  to  present  an  almost  absurd  con- 
trast to  our  size,  and  is  properly  treated  as  little  more  than  a  nucleus 
for  organization  in  case  of  serious  war.  Yet  we  are  a  rich  Nation, 
and  undefended  wealth  invites  aggression.  The  very  liberty  of 
individual  speech  and  action  which  we  so  prize  and  guard  renders 
it  possible  that  at  times  unexpected  causes  of  friction  with  foreign 
powers  may  suddenly  develop.  At  this  moment  we  are  negotiating 
arbitration  treaties  with  all  the  other  great  powers  that  are  willing 
to  enter  into  them.  These  arbitration  treaties  have  a  special  useful- 
ness because  in  the  event  of  some  sudden  disagreement  they  render 
it  morally  incumbent  upon  both  nations  to  seek  first  to  reach  an 
agreement  through  arbitration,  and  at  least  secure  a  breathing  space 
during  which  the  cool  judgment  of  the  two  nations  involved  may  get 
the  upper  hand  over  any  momentary  burst  of  anger.  These  arbitra- 
tion treaties  are  entered  into  not  only  with  the  hope  of  preventing 
wrongdoing  by  others  against  us,  but  also  as  a  proof  that  we  have  no 
intention  of  doing  wrong  ourselves. 

Yet  it  is  idle  to  assume,  and  from  the  standpoint  of  national  in- 
terest and  honor  it  is  mischievous  folly  for  any  statesman  to  assume, 
that  this  world  has  yet  reached  the  stage,  or  has  come  within  measur- 
able distance  of  the  stage,  when  a  proud  nation,  jealous  of  its  honor 


AMERICAN    NAVAL   POLICY.  27 

and  conscious  of  its  great  mission  in  the  world,  can  be  content  to  rely 
for  peace  upon  the  forbearance  of  other  powers.  It  would  be  equally 
foolish  to  rely  upon  each  of  them  possessing  at  all  times  and  under 
all  circumstances  and  provocations  an  altruistic  regard  for  the  rights 
of  others.  Those  who  hold  this  view  are  blind  indeed  to  all  that 
has  gone  on  before  their  eyes  in  the  world  at  large.  They  are  blind 
to  what  has  happened  in  China,  in  Turkey,  in  the  Spanish  posses- 
sions, in  Central  and  South  Africa  during  the  last  dozen  years. 
For  centuries  China  has  cultivated  the  very  spirit  which  our  own 
peace- at-any-price  men  wish  this  country  to  adopt.  For  centuries 
China  has  refused  to  provide  military  forces  and  has  treated  the 
career  of  the  soldier  as  inferior  in  honor  and  regard  to  the  career 
of  the  merchant  or  of  the  man  of  letters.  There  never  has  been  so 
large  an  empire  which  for  so  long  a  time  has  so  resolutely  proceeded 
on  the  theory  of  doing  away  with  what  is  called  "militarism." 
Whether  the  result  has  been  happy  in  international  affairs  I  need 
not  discuss;  all  the  advanced  reformei^  and  farsighted  patriots  in 
the  Chinese  Empire  are  at  present  seeking  (I  may  add,  with  our 
hearty  good  will)  for  a  radical  and  far-reaching  reform  in  internal 
affairs.  In  external  affairs  the  policy  has  resulted  in  various  other 
nations  now  holding  large  portions  of  Chinese  territory,  while  there 
is  a  very  acute  fear  in  China  lest  the  Empire,  because  of  its  defense- 
lessness.  be  exposed  to  absolute  dismemberment,  and  its  well-wishers 
are  able  to  help  it  only  in  a  small  measure,  because  no  nation  can 
help  any  other  unless  that  other  can  help  itself. 

The  State  Department  is  continually  appealed  to  to  interfere  on 
behalf  of  peoples  and  nationalities  who  insist  that  they  are  suffering 
from  oppression — now  Jews  in  one  country,  now  Christians  in  an- 
other ;  now  black  men  said  to  be  oppressed  by  white  men  in  Af rica* 
Armenians,  Koreans,  Finns,  Poles,  representatives  of  all,  appeal 
at  times  to  this  Government.  All  of  this  oppression  is  alleged  to 
exist  in  time  of  profound  peace ;  and  frequently,  although  by  no 
means  always,  it  is  alleged  to  occur  at  the  hands  of  people  who  are 
not  very  formidable  in  a  military  sense.  In  some  cases  the  accusa- 
tions of  oppression  and  wrongdoing  are  doubtless  ill  founded.  In 
others  they  are  well  founded;  and  in  certain  cases  the  most  appall- 
ing loss  of  life  is  shown  to  have  occurred,  accompanied  with  fright- 
ful cruelty.  It  is  not  our  province  to  decide  which  side  has  been 
right  and  which  has  been  wrong  in  all  or  any  of  these  controversies. 
I  am  merely  referring  to  the  loss  of  life.  It  is  probably  a  conserva- 
tive statement  to  say  that  within  the  last  12  years,  at  periods  of  pro- 
found peace  and  not  as  the  result  of  war,  massacres  and  butcheries 
have  occurred  in  which  more  lives  of  men,  women,  and  children 
have  been  lost  than  in  any  single  great  war  since  the  close  of  the 
Napoleonic  struggles.     To  any  public  man  who  knows  of  the  com- 


28  AMERICAN    XA\'AL    POLICY. 

plaints  continually  made  to  the  State  Department  there  is  an  ele- 
ment of  grim  tragedy  in  the  claim  that  the  time  has  gone  by  when 
weak  nations  or  peoples  can  be  oppressed  by  those  that  are  stronger 
without  arousing  effective  protest  from  other  strong  interests. 
Events  still  fresh  in  the  mind  of  every  thinking  man  show  that 
neither  arbitration  nor  an}-  other  device  can  as  yet  be  invoked  to 
prevent  the  gravest  and  most  terrible  wrongdoing  to  peoples  who 
are  few  in  numbers  or  who,  if  numerous,  have  lost  the  first  and 
most  important  of  national  virtues — the  capacity  for  self-defense. 

When  a  nation  is  so  happily  situated  as  is  ours — that  is,  when  it 
has  no  reason  to  fear  or  to  be  feared  by  its  land  neighbors — the  fleet 
is  all  the  more  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  peace.  (Jreat  Britain 
has  been  saved  by  its  fleet  from  the  necessity  of  facing  one  of 
the  two  alternatives — of  submission  to  conquest  by  a  foreign  power 
or  of  itself  becoming  a  great  military  power.  The  United  States 
can  hope  for  a  permanent  career  of  peace  on  only  one  condition,  and 
that  is  on  condition  of  building  and  maintaining  a  first-class  Navy ; 
and  the  step  to  be  taken  toward  this  end  at  this  time  is  to  provide 
for  the  building  of  four  additional  battleships.  I  earnestly  wish 
that  the  Congress  would  pass  the  measures  for  which  I  have  asked 
for  strengthening  and  rendering  more  efficient  the  Army  as  well  as 
the  Navy ;  all  of  these  measures  as  affecting  every  branch  and  detail 
of  both  services  are  sorely  needed,  and  it  would  be  the  part  of  far- 
sighted  wisdom  to  enact  them  all  into  laws,  but  the  most  vital  and 
immediate  need  is  that  of  the  four  battleships. 

To  carry  out  this  policy  is  but  to  act  in  the  spirit  of  George  Wash- 
ington; is  but  to  continue  the  policies  which  he  outlined  when  he 
said,  "  Observe  good  faith  and  justice  toward  all  nations.  Culti- 
vate peace  and  harmony  with  all.  *  *  *  Xothing  is  more  essen- 
tial than  that  permanent,  inveterate  antipathies  against  particular 
nations  and  passionate  attachments  for  others  should  be  excluded 
and  that  in  place  of  them  just  and  amicable  feelings  toAvard  all 
should  be  cultivated.     *     *     * 

"I  can  not  recommend  to  your  notice  measures  for  the  fulfillment 
of  our  duties  to  the  rest  of  the  world  without  again  i^ressing  upon 
you  the  necessity  of  placing  ourselves  in  a  condition  of  com})lete 
defense  and  of  exacting  from  them  the  fulfillment  of  their  duties 
toward  us.  The  Ignited  States  ought  not  to  indulge  in  persuasion 
that,  contrary  to  the  order  of  human  events,  they  will  forever  keep 
at  a  distance  those  painful  appeals  to  arms  with  which  the  history 
of  every  other  nation  abounds.  There  is  a  rank  due  to  the  United 
States  among  nations  which  will  be  withheld,  if  not  absolutely  lost, 
by  the  reputation  of  Aveakness.  If  we  desire  to  avoid  insult,  we  must 
be  able  to  repel  it :   if  Ave  desire  to  secure  peace,  one  of  the  most 


AMERICAN    NAVAL   POLICY.  29 

powerful  instruments  of  our  rising  prosperity,  it  must  be -known 
that  we  are  at  all  times  ready  for  w^ar." 


WILLIAM  HOWARD  TAFT. 

March  4,  1909. 

AVhat  has  been  said  of  the  Army  may  be  affirmed  in  even  a  moro 
emphatic  way  of  the  Navy.  A  modern  Navy  can  not  be  improvised. 
It  must  be  built  and  in  existence  when  the  emergency  arises  which 
calls  for  its  use  and  operation.  My  distinguished  predecessor  has  in 
many  speeches  and  messages  set  out  with  great  force  and  striking 
language  the  necessity  for  maintaining  a  strong  Navy  commensurate 
with  the  coast  line,  the  governmental  resources,  and  the  foreign  trade 
of  our  Nation;  and  I  wish  to  reiterate  all  the  reasons  which  he  has 
presented  in  favor  of  the  policy  of  maintaining  a  strong  Navy  as 
the  best  conservator  of  our  peace  with  other  nations,  and  the  best 
means  of  securing  respect  for  the  assertion  of  our  rights,  the  defense 
of  our  interests,  and  the  exercise  of  our  influence  in  international 
matters. 

December  7,  1909. 

'ihe  return  of  the  battleship  fleet  from  its  voyage  around  the 
world,  in  more  efficient  coi^dition  than  Avhen  it  starteei,  Avas  a  note- 
worthy event  of  interest  alike  to  our  citizens  and  the  naval  authori- 
ties of  the  woi-ld.  Besides  the  beneficial  anel  far-reaching  effect  on 
our  personal  and  diplomatic  relations  in  the  countries  wdiich  the 
fleet  visited,  the  marked  success  of  the  ships  in  steaming  around  the 
world  in  all  weatheVs  on  schedule  time  has  increased  respect  for  our 
Navy  and  has  added  to  our  national  prestige. 


Decemher  6,  1912. 

In  the  past  15  years  the  Navy  has  expanded  rapidl}-,  yet  far  less 
rapidly  than  our  country.  From  now  on  reduced  expenditures  in 
the  Navy  means  reduced  military  strength.  The  world's  history  has 
shown  the  importance  of  sea  power  both  for  adequate  defense  and 
for  the  support  of  important  and  definite  policies. 


WOODROW  WILSON. 

Decemher  8,  191  k. 

A  powerful  Navy  we  have  always  regarded  as  our  proper  and 
natural  means  of  defense;  and  it  has  alw^ays  been  of  defense  that 


30  AMERICAN    NAVAL   POLICY. 

we  have  thought,  never  of  aggression  or  of  conquest.  But  who  shall 
tell  us  now  what  sort  of  a  Navy  to  build  ?  We  shall  take  leave  to 
be  strong  upon  the  seas,  in  the  future  as  in  the  past ;  and  there  will 
be  no  thought  of  ofPense  or  of  provocation  in  that.  Our  ships  are 
our  natural  bulwarks.  When  will  the  experts  tell  us  just  what  kind 
we  should  construct,  and  when  will  they  be  right  for  10  years 
together,  if  the  relative  efficiency  of  craft  of  different  kinds  and  uses 
continues  to  change  as  we  have  seen  it  change  under  our  very  eyes 
in  these  last  few  months  ? 

But  I  turn  away  from  the  subject.  It  is  not  new.  There  is  no 
new  need  to  discuss  it.  We  shall  not  alter  our  attitude  toward  it 
because  some  amongst  us  are  nervous  and  excited.  We  shall  easily 
and  sensibly  agree  upon  a  policy  of  defense.  The  question  has  not 
changed  its  aspect  because  the  times  are  not  normal.  Our  policy 
will  not  be  for  an  occasion.  It  will  be  conceived  as  a  permanent 
and  settled  thing,  which  we  will  pursue  at  all  seasons,  without  haste 
and  after  a  fashion  perfectly  consistent  with  the  peace  of  the  world, 
the  abiding  friendship  of  States,  and  the  unhampered  freedom  of 
all  with  whom  we  deal.  Let  there  be  no  misconception.  The  coun- 
try has  been  misinformed.  We  have  not  been  negligent  of  national 
defense.  We  are  not  unmindful  of  the  great  responsibility  resting 
upon  us.  We  shall  learn  and  profit  by  the  lesson  of  every  experi- 
ence and  every  new  circumstance;  and  what  is  needed  will  be  ade- 
quately done. 


Decemher  7,  1915. 

But  armies  and  instruments  of  war  are  only  pai*t  of  what  has  to 
be  considered  if  we  are  to  provide  for  the  supreme  matter  of  national 
self-sufficiency  and  security  in  all  its  aspects.  There  are  other  great 
matters  which  will  be  thrust  upon  our  attention  whether  we  will  or 
not.  There  is,  for  example,  a  very,  pressing  question  of  trade  and 
shipping  involved  in  this  great  problem  of  national  adequacy.  It  is 
necessary  for  many  weighty  reasons  of  national  efficiency  and  de- 
velopment that  we  should  have  a  great  merchant  marine.  The  great 
merchant  fleet  we  once  used  to  make  us  rich,  that  great  body  of 
sturdy  sailors  who  used  to  carry  our  flag  into  every  sea,  and  who 
were  the  pride  and  often  the  bulwark  of  the  Nation,  we  have  almost 
driven  out  of  existence  by  inexcusable  neglect  and  indifference  and 
by  a  hopelessly  blind  and  provincial  policy  of  so-called  economic  pro- 
tection. It  is  high  time  we  repaired  our  mistake  and  resumed  our 
commercial  independence  on  the  seas. 

o 


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